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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CHARLOTTE HEALEY
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
DFG, INC., a Utah
corporation,

Civil No. 87-0237

Defendant/Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1987).
STATEMENT QF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court properly conclude that Ms.

Charlotte Healey (hereinafter referred to as "Healey1*) was an
employee-at-will and could be discharged for any or no reason
whatsoever?
2.

Did the trial court properly rule that Healey1s

claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress was
legally and factually unsupportable?

3.

Did the court correctly rule that damages for

injury to reputation were inappropriate?
4.

Was the court correct in finding that punitive

damages were not recoverable?
RELEVANT STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated/ § 35-4-2.

Public Policy -

General Welfare Requires Creation of Unemployment Reserves Employment Offices.

(Reproduced in full in the Addendum as

Exhibit D ) .
Utah Code Annotated, § 35-4-11. Administration of
Employment Security Act.

(Reproduced in full in the Addendum

as Exhibit E ) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in
favor of the Respondent/ D.F.G./ Inc./ (hereinafter "D.F.G."),
by the Second District Court in Davis County.
Course of the Proceedings Below
Appellant/ Healey filed suit against her former
employer/ D.F.G./ in Second District Court in Davis County in
October/ 1985.

Following completion of discovery, D.F.G. filed

a Motion for Summary Judgment.

Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

granted D.F.G.vs motion dismissing all of Healey's claims on
August 7/ 1987.

Healey appeals from that judgment.

Statement of Undisputed Facts
Healey was hired by D.F.G., a manufacturer of ski
goggles and other related equipment/ in May of 1977 as a
production line worker.

(Deposition of Healey, hereinafter

"Healey Dep.", Vol 1, p. 3-5). When she was hired/ Healey
received a three page handout of company policies regarding
sick leave, vacations, and holidays.
as the "handout").

(Hereinafter referred to

(Healey Dep.# Vol. 2, p. 83). However, she

offered no evidence that she entered into any type of written
employment contract with D.F.G., or that she was told that she
had a permanent job that would last for a specific period of
time.
Healey was promoted to a supervisory position in the
lens room in August of 1977, and held that position until she
was discharged in February of 1985.

(Healey Dep., Vol. 1,

p. 6). In conjunction with this new position, Healey was paid
an hourly wage instead of the piece-rate wage she had been
receiving on the production line.

However, she still did not

enter into any type of employment contract with D.F.G., nor
were verbal assurances made as to a specified period of
employment.

(Healey Dep., Vol. 1, p. 5-6; Vol. 2, p. 83-84;

Deposition of Reed Leavitt, hereinafter "Leavitt Dep.", p.
27-28).

In 1981/ Healey began reporting to Maria Gray
(hereinafter "Gray") who was, and is, production manager for
D.F.G.

By all accounts, including her own, Ms. Healey resented

Gray's promotion and had a difficult time interacting with
Gray.

(Healey Dep., Vol. 1, p. 13-34; Deposition of E. William

Scott, hereinafter "Scott Dep.", p. 14; Leavitt Dep.,
hereinafter "Leavitt Dep.", p. 29). Personality conflicts
developed and the relationship became hostile and
counter-productive.

(Scott Dep., p. 14). On numerous

occasions, Healey was insubordinate to Gray, refusing and
failing to carry out her orders and instructions.

(Healey

Dep., Vol 2, p. 36-37, and 108-109; Scott Dep., p. 13-14;
Deposition of Gray, hereinafter "Gray Dep.," p. 15-16; and
Leavitt Dep., p. 29).
Both Gray and Leavitt, the plant manager, repeatedly
counseled Healey to try to improve her relationship with Gray.
Healey acknowledged that on at least two occasions she talked
with Leavitt about the problem and that she talked with Gray
directly on "numerous occasions."

(Healey Dep., Vol. 2, p.

21-23; Leavitt Dep., p. 29). However, Healey never
acknowledged that she was responsible for any part of the
conflict and even denied that Gray was her superior.
Illustrative of the situation was Healey's statement to Gray,

-Then I told, I says that, you know, 'I don't work for your
[sic].'

I says, 'I work for D.F.G., 'you know'".

(Healey

Dep., Vol. 2, p. 108-109).
The extent and depth of the animosity which Healey
held towards Gray was dramatically illustrated in a letter
Healey submitted to the Division of Employment Security.
Although this letter was ostensibly filed to aid an employee
seeking unemployment compensation, it was actually a personal
attack on Gray and made no reference to the merits of the
unemployment claim.
1.
2.
3
4.
5.

The letter stated that Gray;

Makes false accusations.
Is neglenijent [sic] of her responsibilities.
No communication (from person-to-person on lower
echelon.)
No dignity (self-respect).
In general she lacks the true responsibility of
manager type of any company, and futhermore [sic]
Rules in company policy were broken by
responsible parties.

(Healey's letter is included in the Addendum as Exhibit A ) .
D.F.G. was unconcerned that Healey had submitted a
letter in support of another employee's unemployment claim, but
was troubled by what the letter reflected about Healey's
attitude towards her direct supervisor.

(Scott Dep., p. 31).

Moreover, Gray was greatly upset by the vicious and
unsubstantiated accusations in the letter.

(Gray Dep., p. 15;

Leavitt Dep., p. 32). Healey's letter reflected the severity

of the conflict and showed that attempts by Gray and others to
improve the relationship had failed. (Scott Dep., p. 32;
Leavitt Dep., p. 32; Gray Dep., p. 15).
Approximately one month after seeing the letter, Gray
informed Leavitt and Scott that she was going to resign.

(Gray

Dep., p. 15; Leavitt Dep.# p. 32). At this point, Leavitt and
Scott, after serious deliberation, made the decision to
discharge Healey in order to ensure the continued employment of
Gray, a critical employee due to her position as production
manager, responsible for all assembly operations.

(Scott Dep.,

p. 51-52; Leavitt Dep., p. 33). Discharge was the only
alternative available, as there were no other jobs available
where Healey would not have to report to, or communicate with,
Gray.

(Scott Dep., p. 57; Leavitt Dep., p. 28, 32-33).
Healey was notified of her discharge in private, after

work had ended on a Friday afternoon.

She was told the reason

for her discharge and paid all back wages, accrued vacation
earnings, and other benefits to which she was entitled.
(Healey Dep., Vol. 2, p. 52-54).

Subsequently, at Healey's

request, and as provided for in the handout, Scott, the
president of D.F.G., reviewed the decision to discharge Ms.
Healey.

He concluded that the action was required so as to

retain the services of Gray, a more valuable employee.

(Scott

Dep., p. 37-38; Healey Dep., Vol. 2, p. 66). Healey then
requested that the matter be submitted to an outside arbitrator
for review.
handout.

This procedure was also provided for in the

A written statement was submitted by D.F.G. and

copied to Healey who was given the opportunity to submit her
own statement.

(Scott Dep., p. 37-38).

submit a statement.

Healey chose not to

(Healey Dep., Vol. 2, p. 81). The

arbitrator, after a careful review of the facts, concluded that
D.F.G. had a valid business reason for the discharge and that,
therefore, the discharge was for "good cause."

(Scott Dep., p.

53).
Healey then filed suit alleging breach of contract,
wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.

(R. 1). After extensive discovery had been

completed D.F.G. moved for summary judgment.

The Honorable

Douglas Cornaby granted D.F.G1s Motion on July 14, 1987, ruling
that under Utah case law Healey was an employee-at-will.
Recognizing the two exceptions to the general
employment-at-will rule, as set forth in Rose v. Allied
Development Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986), the trial court
concluded that Healey failed to produce any evidence to
establish that she was covered by either of the exceptions
(R. 82-83).

(See Exhibits C and D in the Addendum).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court in Rose v. Allied Development Co,, 719 P.2d
83 (Utah 1986), reaffirmed that only two exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine are recognized in Utah:

1) If

employment is for a specified period of time; or 2) If
additional consideration exists.

Construing the pleadings and

the discovery record in the light most favorable to the
appellant, there is no evidence that Healey's employment was
for a specific duration, or that additional consideration
existed.

Additionally, notwithstanding appellant's arguments,

Utah does not recognize a public policy exception to the
employment-at-will rule, nor would it be appropriate to
recognize such an exception under the facts of this case.
Furthermore, even if Healey could only be discharged for just
cause, the uncontroverted evidence establishes just cause.
Appellant's promissory estoppel argument was not
raised below, thus this Court is precluded from even
considering that issue.

Moreover, Healey has failed to offer

any evidence to support the elements of that claim.

Finally,

Healey's claim for damages for injury to reputation, for severe
emotional distress, and for punitive damages are inappropriate
in this case and were properly dismissed by the trial court.
The summary judgment of the trial court should be
affirmed in its entirety.

ARGUMENT
The standard of review to be applied by an appellate
court where summary judgment is granted below is well
established:
Our inquiry on review is whether there is
any genuine issue as to any material fact/
and if there is not, whether the plaintiffs
are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; Frederick May & Co., Inc. v.
Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368, P.2d 266 (1962),
Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc.,
11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960). The
defendant cannot rely upon the mere
allegations or denials of her pleadings to
avoid a summary judgment but must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial, Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P.
Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979).
Respondent D.F.G. established through uncontroverted
testimony and evidence the lack of any material issue of fact.
Further, it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Therefore, the trial court's decision should be affirmed.
POINT I
HEALEY WAS AN EMPLOYEE-AT-WILL, AND HER
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP WITH D.F.G. WAS
TERMINABLE AT THE WILL OF EITHER PARTY.
The Utah Courts have long recognized the common law
doctrine of employment-at-will.

Under this doctrine, both the

employer and the employee are free to terminate the employment
relationship at any time, for any or no reason, absent specific

contractual language limiting this right.

The doctrine was

applied in Held v. American Linen Supply Co., 307 P.2d 210
(Utah 1957), where the Utah Supreme Court was required to
determine whether or not a collective bargaining agreement
limited the employer's right to terminate its employees.

The

Court found that because the contract did not specifically
limit the company's authority, except to prohibit termination
for union activities, "the parties do not intend to limit the
common law right of the parties to discharge or to leave the
employment at the will of either."

Xd. at 212.

Later, in Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc.,
354 P.2d 599, (Utah 1960), a discharged plaintiff brought suit
against his former employer for breach of contract.

While the

contract stated only that the "company agrees to employ Bullock
as its general manager", plaintiff argued that he relied on the
written contract in terminating his previous employment, moving
his family to Salt Lake City, and sustaining a cut in salary
and benefits.

Id. at 560-61.

The trial court granted the

employer's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff
appealed.

Notwithstanding plaintiff's reliance on the promise

of employment, this Court affirmed the summary judgment
concluding that because "the contract did not specify any
definite period of time for the duration of such employment,

the implications are that either party could terminate the
contract at will. . . H .

id. at 562.

This Court continued to subscribe to the employmentat-will rule in Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979).
In Bihlmaier, the trial court determined that the oral
agreement contained no express terms concerning the duration of
employment and granted the employer summary judgment.
Affirming the summary judgment, this Court set forth the
general parameters of the doctrine:
The general rule concerning personal
employment contracts is, in the absence of
some further express or implied stipulation
as to the duration of the employment or of
good consideration in addition to the
services contracted to be rendered, the
contract is no more than an indefinite
general hiring which is terminable at the
will of either party.
Id. at 792.
Rose v. Allied Development Company, 719 P.2d 83 (Utah
1986), leaves no doubt that Utah continues to abide by the rule
set forth in Bihlmaier.

In Rose, the Utah Supreme Court

reiterated the standards set forth in Bihlmaier, emphasizing
that employment is "at-will11 unless there is a:

1) Stipulation

as to the duration of the employment; or 2) Additional
consideration.

Id,, at 792.

A,

The Uncontroverted Evidence Is That Healev's
Employment Was Not For A Specific Period Of Time.

In Rose v. Allied Development Company, 719 P.2d 83
(Utah 1986), this Court explained the first exception to the
general wat-willM doctrine:

An express or implied stipulation

as to the duration of the employment.

In Rose the employee

argued that while he was initially hired for an indefinite
period, subsequent representations made by his boss about his
ability to work and attend school transformed the contract into
a contract for a definite period terminable only for just
cause.

Applying Bihlmaier, the Rose Court rejected the

employee's argument noting that while representations may have
been made, the employee was unable to establish that the
representations went to the duration of the employment
relationship.

Id. at 85.

Even the existence of company policies which go to the
issue of discharge is not sufficient to imply a contract for a
specific period of employment.

The distinction between

generalized company policies and an implied stipulation as to
duration was most recently addressed by the Utah Court of
Appeals in Bruno v. Plateau Mining Company, 73 Utah Adv. Rep.
89 (Dec. 22, 1987).

In Bruno the court affirmed a summary

judgment in favor of the employer in a wrongful discharge case
brought by an employee who was fired for fighting.

The

employee argued that the company had violated its policy of
only suspending employees for fighting, and not discharging
them, and that his termination was therefore wrong.

The court

held that even a personnel policy favoring suspension rather
than termination was insufficient to establish an employer's
intention to relinquish its right to terminate employees at
will.

The court noted:
Even if we assume that Plateau [the
employer] has a de facto personnel policy of
not terminating employees who fight in its
mines, this practice alone is not enough to
establish Plateau's intentional surrender of
its right to terminate Bruno's employment at
will.

Id. at 91.
Importantly, Rose also requires that the stipulation
as to duration must be recognized by both parties.

This Court

explained that a stipulation as to duration must be established
by more than subjective understandings or expectations of the
employee.

Id. at 86.

For example, in Rose this Court

concluded that the plaintiff's belief that he would not be
terminated while he attended school, based on conversations
with his supervisor concerning his continuing education, was
insufficient to establish a stipulation as to duration and
remove the employee from the at will employment category.

Here, Healey was unable to present any evidence that
there was a stipulation as to the duration of her employment,
or that continued employment was something other than her own
subjective understanding or hope.
Healey Dep., Vol. 2, p. 83-84).

(Leavitt Dep., p. 27-28;
Instead, Healey has resorted

to arguing, citing to case authority from other jurisdictions,
that a contract was created by D.F.G. through the vague
statements on job security made in the handout.
Brief, p. 10-12).

(Appellant's

However, this is the very argument that is

specifically rejected by the court in Bruno.

Id. at 90. The

issue is not whether some general employment policies had been
enacted, but whether the employer has specifically given up its
right to terminate its employees "at-will".
The three page handout simply offers no support for
the argument that D.F.G. has given up this right.

The handout

contains absolutely no statements that Healey1s employment
would be for a specific period of time.

The handout merely

explains the company's policy with respect to such things as
fair treatment, discrimination, holidays, vacations, medical
insurance, discipline, sick leave, and funeral leave.

Granted,

Scott admitted that the company considered itself and its
employees bound by the handout (Scott Dep., p. 36-37).
However, this just means that all employees are entitled to

receive the stipulated sick leave# holiday and vacation time,
and other specifically enumerated benefits.

These benefits do

not constitute a stipulation as to duration of employment/ and
indeed are not even at issue, as Healey admitted she received
all of the benefits set forth in the handout to which she was
entitled.

(Healey Dep./ Vol. 3/ p. 52-54).
There is no dispute, factual or legal/ but that Healey

was hired as an employee-at-will.

Although she was later

promoted to a supervisory function/ she never received a
written agreement/ nor was she ever told that she would be
employed for a specific period of time.

At all times, Healey

had the right to leave her employment at D.F.G. if she felt
dissatisfied with her situation.

The nature of the employment

relationship was not changed just because Healey believed that
she could not be terminated "at-will.H

The D.F.G. handout on

which Healey relies contains no specific guarantees as to
duration of employment. As in Bruno, mere allegations by Healey
are insufficient/ as a matter of law# to support a claim under
the first exception recognized in Bihlmaier and Rose.
B.

Healey Failed to Offer Evidence of Additional
Consideration Sufficient to Remove her from the
Employment-at-Will Category

Under Bihlmaier and Rose, there is a second exception
to the employment-at-will doctrine:

Additional consideration.

According to this Court in Rose, to show additional good
consideration, the employee must prove that she offered
"something more than what [she] was already obligated to do
under [her] employment agreement."

id. 86.

Additionally, Rose

requires that the consideration "result in a detriment to the
employee and a benefit to the employer."

Id.

Applying these

requirements the Court in Rose noted that while the plaintiff
incurred expenses for tuition and books, the employer did not
accrue a corresponding benefit.

Id. at

86.

While Healey

cites cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that
continued employment alone is sufficient to constitute
additional consideration, this is simply not the law in Utah.
Healey introduced absolutely no evidence of
"additional consideration".

The undisputed facts established

that Healey performed her job and was paid for doing so.

She

performed no additional services nor undertook any extra work
or responsibilities.

Nor is there evidence that Healey gave up

another job to work at D.F.G., or gave up other career
opportunities to continue her employment there.

(Healey Dep.,

Vol. 1, p. 5). In short, Healey presented no evidence to
establish either a detriment to herself or a corresponding
benefit to D.F.G.

As the trial court found, there was nothing

which would fit Healey into the second exception expressed in
Bihlmaier and Rose.

The uncontroverted facts established that Healey was
an employee at will.

As such, D.F.G. had the right to

terminate her for any or no reason at all, without incurring
any liability.

Accordingly, Healey had no cause of action

against D.F.G. arising from her discharge and the trial court
properly granted summary judgment in favor of D.F.G.
C.

Appellants Reliance on the Doctrine of
Promissory Estoppel is Improper.

Appellant argues that even if she is unable to come
within the Rose exceptions, she can recover from D.F.G. under
the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

This argument is raised

for the first time on appeal, and accordingly, this Court is
precluded from considering it.

"It is axiomatic that defenses

and claims not raised by the parties in the trial cannot be
considered for the first time on appeal."

Bangerter v.

Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983).
Additionally, the uncontroverted facts show that
Healey has not proven at least two of the elements of this
cause of action.

Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of

Contracts, cited with approval in Rose v. Allied Development
Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986), sets forth the elements of
promissory estoppel.

A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or
forebearance on the part of the promisee and
which does induce such action or
forebearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise•
In Rose, this Court stated that the promise of
continued employment Mwould require more than [the employee's]
subjective understanding" that the statements made by the
employer constituted a promise•

id. at 87.

There has to be a

finding that the assumptions of the employee were justified.
As in Rose, Healey presented no evidence that there was
something more than her "subjective understanding" that she
would not be terminated.

As discussed in detail in the

previous sections of this brief, the handout merely contains
some general work rules and benefits, but does not limit
D.F.G,'s right to terminate its employees.

Appellant's

argument that because D.F.G. was bound by these work rules a
••promise of continued employment existed" is therefore
unpersuasive.

(Appellant's Brief, page 17).

Appellant also presented no evidence that D.F.G.'s
alleged promise induced action or forebearance on her part.
She left no other job, forewent no career opportunities, nor
took any other action in reliance on the alleged "promise."
She simply went to work at D.F.G. for as long as she had a
job.

(Healey Dep., Vol. 1, p. 5).

Finally-/ as this Court concluded in Rose, the facts of
this case compared to those in Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck
Center, Inc., 354 P.2d 559 (Utah 1960)/ simply do not warrant
recovery.

In Bullock, the plaintiff had incurred substantial

out-of-pocket expenses, sold his house, moved/ and accepted
reduced benefits and salary in reliance on his understanding of
the employment agreement.

Yet the Court denied recovery.

The

Rose Court's comments regarding Bullock are applicable here:
Certainly, the equities in Bullock favored
an estoppel as a way of compensating the
plaintiff for his considerable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred in reliance on his
understanding of the employment agreement.
Nevertheless, we refused to override the
at-will doctrine to imply a term of
employment in the contract to which the
employer had not expressly agreed.
Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
If the doctrine of promissory estoppel was
inapplicable in Bullock, and Rose, this Court must reject the
application of the doctrine on the weaker facts presented in
the instant case.

The Court should therefore affirm the

summary judgment.
D.

The Public Policy Exception to the At-Will
Employment Relationship is Inapplicable in this
Case.

Appellant also argues that her discharge by D.F.G.
contravened a broad concept of public policy.
unpersuasive for several reasons.

This argument is

First, even if the Utah courts recognized such an
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, it would not
apply here because the reason for Healey1s discharge cannot be
construed, by any stretch of the imagination, as contravening
public policy.

Notwithstanding her unsupported allegations,

Healey was uncontrovertibly discharged for a valid business
reason:

D.F.G. could not afford to lose a more valuable

employee, Gray, its production manager, who would have quit
unless Healey was terminated.

Healey was simply not discharged

for attempting to help a fellow employee obtain unemployment
benefits.

(Gray Dep., p. 15; Leavitt Dep., p. 32-33; Scott

Dep., p. 51-52).

Termination for a valid business reason

cannot, and does not, contravene public policy.
The distinction between a violation of public policy
and the deterioration of an employee-employer relationship
justifying a discharge was illustrated in Abrisz v. Pullev
Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978).

Like Healey,

the plaintiff in Abrisz wrote a letter ostensibly to aid a
fellow employee seeking unemployment benefits.

However, the

letter was based on inaccurate facts and was extremely critical
of the employer and its practices.

The company learned of the

letter when it became part of the hearing record.
Subsequently, the company vice president sent a letter to the
plaintiff terminating her employment and explaining:

The letter [on behalf of the plaintiffs
co-worker] appeared to contain
mis-statements which were calculated to
influence the outcome of the hearing and
which reflected on the integrity of Pulley
Freight Lines, Inc. Subsequent to the
hearing we were provided a copy of your
letter which confirmed the erroneous and
prejudicial nature of the statements
referred to at the hearing.
Id. at 456.
The plaintiff brought suit alleging that her discharge
contravened public policy.

The appellate court affirmed the

trial court decision in favor of the employer, holding that the
plaintiff did not establish a violation of public policy.
"Courts should not declare conduct violative of public policy
unless it is clearly so. . .In considering this matter we keep
in mind that the rights of the employer, as well as those of
the employee, are important."

Id.

The court explained that

while the letter was the occasion for plaintiffs discharge,
the company's actions were not violative of public policy
because the relationship between the employee and employer had
been destroyed.

Thus, the employer was justified in

discharging the plaintiff.
The facts of this case parallel the facts in Abrisz.
D.F.G. presented uncontroverted testimony that a personality
conflict existed between Healey and her direct supervisor and
production manager, Gray.

(See Statement of Undisputed Facts,

p. 4). Healey's letter resulted in her discharge because it
undermined the fragile relationship between her and Gray,
D.F.G. should be allowed to discharge employees to ensure
continued production and its own business future, without being
second guessed.
Even if the facts are as recited by Healey, she can
point to no "public policy" which has been violated.

At best

Healey relies on broad statements found in the Utah Employment
Security Act.

However, Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-11 merely

enumerates the investigatory duties of the commission while
§ 35-4-2 declares unemployment to be a public concern.

The Act

does not, however, provide the specificity which other courts
have required as a prerequisite to declaring a public policy
exception.
The jurisdictions that have recognized a public policy
exception construe it very narrowly, and require as a threshold
showing, a 'clear mandate' of public policy to preserve the
powers of each governmental branch.

Parnar v. American Hotels,

652 P.2d 625 (Hawaii 1982);

Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co.,

685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984).

Palmateer v. International

Harvester, 421 N.E. 2d 876 (111. 1981).

Broad general

statements of policy contained in a statute are insufficient to
support a claim under the exception.

Lampe v. Presbyterian

Medical Center, 590 P.2d 513 (Col. App. 1978) (Colorado statute
allowing State Board of Nursing to discipline nurses for
negligent or willful actions was insufficient to attribute to
the legislature an intent to change the relationship between
employer and employee); Cain v. Kansas Corp. Commission; 673
P.2d 451 (Kan. App. 1983) (public employee terminated for
outspoken advocacy of consumers did not come within a public
policy exception despite broad policy statements of Securities
Act that employee's role was to implement agencies' policy).
The public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine has been allowed only in very narrow circumstances/
usually when a direct violation of a statute has occurred or a
clear public policy exists.

See Petermann v. International

Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (employee
discharged for refusing to evade jury duty); Harless v. First
National Bank 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (employee terminated
for refusing to violate a consumer credit code; Brown v.
Transcon Lines, 588 P.2d 1087 (Or. 1978) (employee fired for
filing claim under worker's compensation statute); Tamenv v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (employee
discharged for refusing to engage in price fixing).

Appellant's argument for a broad public policy
exception to the general at-will employment rule also ignores
the problems that could result if businesses were faced with
litigation and damages every time an employer decided to
discharge an employee.

Even professor Blades, who promotes an

expansion of exceptions to the general rule in his article,
Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom:

On Limiting the

Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L.Rev, 1404
(1967), recognized the adverse effect such litigation would
have on the employers business.
[T]here is the danger that the average jury
will identify with and therefore believe,
the employee. This possibility could give
rise to vexatious lawsuits by disgruntled
employees fabricating plausible tales of
employer coercion. If the potential for
vexatious suits by discharged employees is
too great, employers will be inhibited in
exercising their best judgment as to which
employees should or should not be
retained. . . [T]he employer's prerogative
to make independent, good faith judgments
about employees is important in our free
enterprise system.
id. at 1428.
Others have expressed concern about a state's economic
environment when considering an expansion of the public policy
exception.

The deteriorating business climate of the state was

a concern for the dissent in Palmateer v. International
Harvester, 421 N.E.2d 876 (111. 1981):

It must be acknowledged, however, that
Illinois is not attracting a great amount of
new industry and business and that
industries are leaving the state at a
troublesome rate, I do not believe that
this court should further contribute to the
declining business environment by creating a
vague concept of public policy which will
permit an employer to discharge an unwanted
employee, one who could be completely
disruptive of labor management
relations. . • only at the risk of being
sued in tort not only for compensatory
damages, but also for punitive damages.
Id. at 885 (Ryan, J., dissenting.)
In short, appellant demands that this Court take on
the role which it has specifically refused to assume.

As this

Court stated in Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953 (Utah 1983):
It is the power and responsibility of the
legislature to enact laws to promote public
health, safety, morals, and general welfare
of society,. . . and this Court will not
substitute our judgment for that of the
Legislature with respect to what best serves
the public interest. The adjustment and
accommodation of conflicting interests, such
as are involved in this case, are for the
Legislature to resolve, irrespective of the
rules applied by other states.
Id. at 956.
A public policy departure from the at-will employment
rule could result in the very unemployment burden the
Unemployment Act was created to avoid as businesses relocate or
close when faced with liability and damages merely for
discharging an employee.

Whether such risk should be assumed

by eviscerating the doctrine of employment-at-will is a
decision for the legislature and not the courts.
POINT II
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT HEALEY WAS NOT AN
EMPLOYEE AT WILL, GOOD CAUSE EXISTED FOR HER
DISCHARGE.
Even if Healey was not an employee at-will, summary
judgment was still proper because the undisputed facts
establish that good or just cause existed for her discharge.
Thus, the undisputed facts establish that there was a valid
business reason for Healey's discharge, (i.e. Mgood or just
cause").

Therefore, the trial court could rule as a matter of

law that her discharge was proper.
Although the concept of "just cause" is difficult to
define, the Ohio Supreme Court in Harp v. Administrator, Bureau
of Unemployment Compensation, 12 Ohio Misc. 34, 230 N.E.2d 376
(Ohio 1967), offered an extremely workable definition.

The

Ohio court concluded that "'just cause* means that if an
impartial person examined all the facts and circumstances of
the case, he would conclude that the discharge was merited."
Here, an examination of the undisputed facts leads to
the inescapable conclusion that Healey's discharge was
justified.

Everyone, including Healey, acknowledged that a

severe personality conflict existed between Healey and Gray.
(Healey Dep., Vol. 2, p. 108-109).

Further, it is undisputed

that D.F.G. made considerable efforts to resolve this dispute
by holding meetings between Gray and Healey and between Healey
and the plant manager, Leavitt.

Notwithstanding these efforts

at reconciliation, the dispute was brought "to a head" by
Healey's letter which directly and personally attacked Gray.
This letter angered and upset Gray, who concluded that she
could no longer work with Healey.
Scott that she was quitting.

Gray informed Leavitt and

Leavitt and Scott decided that

they could not afford to lose their production manager, and
that the only solution was to discharge Healey.

This was the

only alternative available because there were no positions or
jobs available to which Healey could have been assigned that
would have removed her from contact with Gray.

(See Statement

of Undisputed Facts, p. 6).
In short, Healey was discharged so that D.F.G.vs
production could continue unimpeded.

Such a reason irrefutably

constitutes a valid business justification for Healey's
discharge.

An employer has the right to discharge any

employee, even one who is not "at-will" when good or just cause
exists.

Therefore, there is no legal basis whatsoever for

Healey's claims, even if she arguably was not an
employee-at-will.

While the existence of good cause may be factual/
Healey failed to offer any evidence to contradict D.F.G.'s
reasons (the facts) for her termination.

That is, she has

failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact.

"The mere

assertion that an issue of fact exists without a proper
evidentiary foundation to support that assertion is
insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary judgment."
Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983).

Thus,

summary judgment in favor of D 0 F e G. was appropriate even if
this Court concludes that good or just cause was required
before Healey could be discharged.
POINT III
HEALEY FAILED TO ESTABLISH FACTS TO SUPPORT
HER CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
Appellant's complaint also stated a cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of
D.F.G.'s intentional termination of her employment.

However,

Healey failed to offer any evidence to prove the elements of
this tort.
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress in Samms v.
Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 346 (Utah 1961):

Our study of the authorities, and of the
arguments advanced, convinces us that,
conceding such a cause of action may not be
based upon mere negligence, the best
considered view recognizes an action for
severe emotional distress . . . where the
defendant intentionally engaged in some
conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the
purpose of inflicting emotional distress,
or, (b) where any reasonable person would
have known that such would result; and his
actions are of such a nature as to be
considered outrageous and intolerable in
that they offend against the generally
accepted standards of decency and morality.
Comment HdH to Section 46 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, (cited with approval in Pentecost v. Harward, 699
P.2d 696 (Utah 1985)), emphasizes the degree to which a
defendant's conduct must exceed all reasonable bounds:
Liability has been found only where the
conduct has been so outrageous in character,
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in civilized community.
Generally, the case is one in which the
recitation of facts to an average member of
the community would arouse his resentment
against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,
"Outrageous!M
This Court recently stated that a discharge from
employment, even a wrongful one, does not rise to the level of
outrageous conduct necessary to establish an intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

In Sperber v. Galigher Ash

Company, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (November 25, 1987), the plaintiff

brought suit against his employer of eleven years, asserting
wrongful discharge, breach of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing under the collective bargaining agreement, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress•

The trial court

granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding
that the under Utah law the plaintiff had failed to state a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
at 3.

Id.

This Court affirmed, holding that even if the

plaintiff's version of the facts was true, the plaintiff had
failed to state a claim for relief.

"Mere discharge from

employment does not constitute outrageous or intolerable
conduct by an employer . . . Undoubtedly, every employee who
believes he has a legitimate grievance concerning his discharge
from employment experiences some emotional anguish as a result
of that belief."

Id. at 4-5.

This Court suggested that the

employer's actions would have to be as outlandish as damaging
the employee's car to rise to the necessary level of
outrageousness.
Here, as in Sperber, the uncontroverted facts show
that the discharge was handled in a thoughtful and sensitive
manner.

Healey was approached on a Friday afternoon, by Gray

and Leavitt, after virtually all other employees had left the
factory.

She was calmly told that she was being terminated and

was given the reasons for her termination.

She was then paid

all back wages and other benefits which were due and owing to
her.

(Healey Dep., Vol. 2, p. 52-54).

Finally, her discharge

was reviewed by both the president of D.F.G. and by an outside
arbitrator.

(Scott Dep., p. 37-38).

As a matter of law, the

actions of D.F.G. are neither atrocious nor intolerable.
Accordingly, even if this Court concludes that summary
judgment was erroneous on appellant's breach of contract
claims, summary judgment with respect to the claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress should be affirmed.
POINT IV.
DAMAGES FOR INJURY TO REPUTATION ARE NOT
RECOVERABLE IN A BREACH OF EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACT CASE.
Healey*s complaint also sought damages for an alleged
injury to her reputation.

However, she was unable to provide

any evidence of damage to her reputation.

Thus, summary

judgment should be affirmed because the M[m]ere assertion that
an issue of fact exists without proper evidentiary foundation
to support that assertion is insufficient to preclude granting
summary judgment."

Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983).

During the course of Healey's deposition, the only
-damage" that she expressed was an ill-defined and
unsubstantiated claim that she was having difficulty finding a
job:

Question (Mr. Strindberg): Will you explain
to me what you mean by the term damage to
your reputation?
Answer (Healey): Well, the damages that
I've seen to my reputation like I mentioned
before, it's harder for a person my age to
go out and try to get a job. And when I
fill out application forms, I put down the
reasons why I left my previous job. I put
fired on there and put down the reason why I
was fired. And, it just seems that I get a
call back on every one of them. They want
more information on my part of the
personality conflict, that they felt that if
I had the problem there, I would also have a
problem at the new job. So, it was always
there, no matter when I went.
Question (Mr. Strindberg): Is there any
other way that your reputation has. been
damaged?
Answer (Healey):

I can't think of any.

Deposition of Healey, Vol. 2, p. 91-92.
Furthermore, as a matter of law, Healey is not
entitled to recover damages for injury to reputation inasmuch
as the gravamen of her Complaint was a breach of an employment
contract.

Courts have uniformly held that such damages are not

awardable in breach of contract suits.

O'Leary v. Sterling

Extruder Corp., 533 F.Supp. 1205, 1209 (E.D. Wise. 1982);
Skagway School Board v. Davis, 543 P.2d 218 (Alaska 1975).
In Skagway, the court explained the two primary
reasons for the general rule prohibiting damages for injury to
reputation in a breach of employment contract suit:

(1) The

computation of damages for injury to reputation is speculative;
and (2) Such damages cannot reasonably be assumed to be within
the contemplation of the parties when they entered into the
contract.

Id. at 225.

The court went on to analyze how

damages for injury to reputation fall outside of the limits set
forth in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 EX. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145
(1854).

The Court concluded that the refusal to award damages

for injury to reputation in an employment contract is
particularly inappropriate "for entities which enter into a
relatively small number of contracts which may not be presumed
to be very sophisticated about the law of contract or the
liability stemming from the breach."

id. at 227.

The reasons cited in Skaaway are particularly apt in
this situation.
company.

D.F.G. is not a large or sophisticated

Accordingly, even if D.F.G. has been guilty of breach

of an employment contract, such damages should be limited to
what Healey could have reasonably expected to earn, minus any
actual earnings which she has received or should have received.
POINT V
PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE NOT APPROPRIATE IN THIS
CASE.
A.

Punitive Damages Are Not Recoverable in a Breach
of Contract Action.

The law in Utah, as well as in other states, is that
punitive damages are not recoverable in a breach of contract
action.

As this court stated in Hal Taylor Associates v.

UnionAmerican Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982):
We prefer the standard articulated by the
Kansas Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. Allstate
Insurance Company, 217 Kansas 262, 535 P.2d
919 (1975), which states that breach of
contract, standing alone, does not call for
punitive damages, even if intentional and
unjustified. . . .
Id. at 750.
Other courts have concluded that this prohibition
against an award of punitive damages is applicable in wrongful
discharge/ breach of employment contract cases, even if there
was a bad motive underlying the discharge.

Kamlar Corp. v.

Haley, 299 S.E. 2d 514 (Va. 1983); Eklund v. Vincent Brass &
Aluminum Co.. 351 N.W. 2d 371 (Minn. 1984).

The reasoning

behind this prohibition is the same as that underlying the
prohibition against damages for injury to reputation:

Damages

for an alleged breach of contract should be limited to those
which flow directly and foreseeably from the breach . See,
Eklund.
The basis for Healey's charges against D.F.G. are for
breach of an alleged employment contract.

Plaintiff has

presented absolutely no evidence of an independent tort which

would support punitive damages•

Indeed, the whole manner in

which plaintiff's termination was handled (i.e. no action was
taken without considerable forethought and the discharge was
handled in a tactful and appropriate manner) belies any
contention that D.F.G. acted in a tortious manner,

(See

Statement of Undisputed Facts, p. 6).
Additionally, even if this Court recognizes a public
policy exception to the employment at will doctrine, punitive
damages would still be inappropriate.

In Vigil v. Arizola, 699

P.2d 613 (N.M. App. 1983), the court recognized a public policy
exception where the plaintiff asserted retaliatory discharge in
connection with his reports of his employer's misuse of state
and federal money.

However, the court refused to allow the

plaintiff to recover punitive damages because the employer
could not have anticipated beforehand that the public policy
claim would be actionable.

Id. at 621.

Accordingly, even if this court should find summary
judgment was improper with respect to Healey's contract claims,
punitive damages should be disallowed.
B.

Assuming, Arguendo, that Healey's Claims are
Based in Tort, the Evidence Does Not Raise a
Material Issue of Fact as to Whether Punitive
Damages Were Appropriate.

In Behrens v. Raleigh Hills HOSP., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179
(Utah 1983), this Court stated the prevalent rule on punitive

damages:

compensatory damages are generally appropriate while

punitive damages are proper only in exceptional cases.
1186.

Id, at

The court explained:
Our cases have generally held that
punitive damages may be awarded only on
proof of 'willful and malicious1 conduct, .
. . or on proof of conduct which manifests a
knowing and reckless indifference toward,
and disregard of the rights of others, . • .
Punitive damages should be awarded
infrequently. Simple negligence will never
suffice as a basis upon which such damages
may be awarded. (Citations omitted.)
Applied to the facts of this case, Healey failed to

offer any evidence that D.F.G.'s conduct was willful and
malicious.

The uncontroverted testimony established that

Healey was discharged because of a personality conflict with
her supervisor.

Moreover, the action was a valid business

decision made after considerable thought by management, and was
handled in a very considerate and thoughtful manner.

Accord-

ingly, punitive damages are not appropriate.

CONCLUSION
The facts establish that Healey was an "at-will"
employee.

During the time that she worked for D.F.G. she never

entered into a contract, oral or written, that provided for a
specific period of employment and provided no additional
consideration which could support a claim of a right to

continued employment.

Furthermore, her termination was not

violative of public policy/ but was necessitated by a valid
business reason.

While discharge from a job is never pleasant,

courts should be cautious of imposing liability on a business
under these circumstances.
The trial court carefully reviewed all of the facts
and circumstances surrounding Healey's discharge and applied
the proper legal standards in ruling that Healey was an
employee-at-will whose discharge was proper.
For the reasons stated above. Respondent respectfully
urges the Court to reaffirm the summary judgment in favor of
Respondent, and award it costs and expenses incurred in
defending against this Appeal.
DATED this &'<£:* day of March/ 1988.
PRINCE/ YEATES & GELDZAHLER

John S. Chindlund
.—^
Erik Strindberg
^^J
Attorneys for Defendant
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Exhibit A

Letter from Charlotte Healey

(Healey Dep., Vol. 2, Exhibit 1).

Exhibit B

Ruling on Motion (R. 82-83)

Exhibit C

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and

Judgment (R. 86-88)

Exhibit D

U.C.A. § 35-4-2 (1953, as amended)

Exhibit E

U.C.A. § 35-4-11 (1953, as amended)
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CHARLOTTE HEALY,
Plaintiff,

RULING ON MOTION

vs.
D.F.G., INC.,

Civil No. 38293

Defendant.

The defendant's motion for summary judgment came before the
court for oral argument on July 14, 1987.
Jack C. Helgesen
appeared as attorney for the plaintiff and John Chindlund
appeared as attorney for the defendant. After oral argument, the
court took the motion under advisement. The court has reviewed
the submitted depositions, and now rules on the motion.
The paramount issue facing this court is whether or not
plaintiff was an employee of the defendant who was terminable "at
will."
An employment at will contract allows both parties to
terminate the contract at any time, without justification. Most
employment contracts are of this type.
There are certain
exceptions to this rule, most notably the federal prohibitions on
discharges based on race, color, religion, sex, nationality, age
or handicap.
See Civil Rights Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C.
2000e2(a)(l), and U.S.A., 1953, 34-35-6. Also, good consideration
in addition to the services to be rendered might be enough to
overcome the "at will" categorization. This consideration must
result in a detriment to the employee and a benefit to the
employer.
Rose vs. Allied Development Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah
1986).
However, absent these factors or an express or implied

FILMED

stipulation to the contrary, "the contract is no more than an
indefinite general hiring which is terminable at the will of
either party." (Bihlmaier vs. Carson, 603 P. 2d 792 (Utah 1979).
The court has carefully reviewed the circumstances of this
case and can find nothing to indicate that the plaintiff was
employed under a contract other than one terminable at the will
of either party.
There is nothing indicating a length of
employment
and
no
claim
arising
under
discrimination.
Plaintiff's interpretation of the nature of the three page
company handout is not enough:
The existence of an employment agreement not terminable
at will must be established by more than subjective
understandings or expectations. Rose at 86.
The court must look to the entirety of the circumstances in
making its determination of the nature of the employment.
It is not the court's intention to rule upon the propriety
of the defendant's actions; under well established Utah law the
plaintiff was terminable at the will of the defendant and no
showing of cause is therefore required.
The defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby
granted.
The defendant is ordered to draw a formal order consistent
with this ruling.
Dated August 7, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Jack C. Helgesen, 4768
Harrison Blvd., Ogden, Utah 84403 and John Chindlund, Third Floor
MONY Plaza, 424 East Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on
August 7, 1987.
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Healey v. D.F.G.

Dear Jack:
Enclosed please find the formal Order dismissing
Charlotte Healey1s claims with prejudice pursuant to Rule 2.9
of the Local Rules of Practice. Any objections to said Order
must be submitted within five days after service. However, if
you do not object to the form of the Order, could you please
sign it in the space provided and forward it to the Court.
If objections are not received by August 25th, this
Order will be submitted to the court.
Sincerely,
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
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Erik Strindberg
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PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
John S. Chindlund (0625)
Erik Strindberg (4154)
Attorneys for Defendant
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHARLOTTE HEALEY,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND JUDGMENT

vs
D.F.G., INC,, a Utah
corporation,

Civil No.

Defendant •

38293

Judge Douglas Cornaby

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for
hearing before the Court, Honorable Douglas Cornaby, District
Judge, presiding, on July 14, 1987, at 3:30 p.m.

Plaintiff was

represented by Jack C. Helgesen and defendant was represented
by John S. Chindlund.

Having heard oral argument, reviewed the

memoranda filed by the parties and the depositions and other
pleadings on file with the Court, and having examined the
entirety of the circumstances surrounding plaintiff's
employment, the Court hereby enters the following as its
findings of fact and conlusions of law and judgment:
fEATES
AHLER
, Suite 900
jrth South

FILMED

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff's employment by defendant was as an

employee-at-will, and, as such, her employment was terminable
by defendent without any requirement that defendant have good
or just cause therefore.
2.

The undisputed facts provide no evidence to

support any exceptions to take plaintiff's employment out of
the category of employment-at-will.

Specifically, there is no

evidence (a) that plaintiff's discharge was discriminatory
under or violative of any Federal or State law; (b) that
plaintiff provided or performed any additional services
resulting in a detriment to her or benefit to defendant, #(c)
that plaintiff and defendant had an express or implied contract
of employment other than one for an indefinite period
terminable at the will of either party; (d) that the written
materials (hand out) provided to plaintiff by defendant
established a contract of employment, notwithstanding the
subjective understanding or expectations of plaintiff; or (e)
that plaintiff's termination was violative of any State or
Federal public policy.
JUDGMENT
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, it is ordered and adjudged that plaintiff's
Complaint be, and the same hereby is, dismissed with prejudice
r
EATES
IHLER
Suite 900
irth South

-2-

and in its entirety, with the parties to bear their own costs
and attorneys' fees.
DATED this

,XL^

day of August, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

r
!

y*
t*-'<*~-

udge vofrrt aby
—' Judge

APPROVED:

Jack C. Helgesen
5150S
081487

•ATES
HLER
>uite900
th South
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LABOR—INDUSTRIAL
of Ttali, 1!>39, r e l y i n g to unemployment
compensation; and providing ior other related purposes.—L. 1941, eh. 40.
Constitutionality.
Unemployment Compensation L a w (354-1 et seq.) is not unconstitutional as not
clearly expressing its subject m a t t e r in its
title. * Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. Industrial Comtn., PS I ' . 36, 91 P. 2d 512.
Unemployment Compensation Law does
not impair contract vt employee with employer which existed for some time prior
to enactment of the law. Globe Grain &
Milling Co. v. Industrial Comm., 9S U. 3G,
91 P. 2d 512.
Unemployment Compensation L a w is
not un. onsiitutunial a& \ i u l a t i \ e of due
process of law, whether it be enacted in
exercise of taking power or police power.
Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. I n d u s t r i a l
Comm., 9$ U. 3G, 91 P. 2d 512.
Procedure.
Each record of trial under this law
should be complete in and of itself, and
each element necessarv to sustain an order

COMMISSION

by the tribunal or commission should be
supported by testimony, exhibits or s t i p u .
lation introduced at the hearing, the rule
being no different than in industrial accidents. Roberis v. Industrial Comm., 97 TJ
434. 93 P. 2d 494.
Rights under Employment Security Act
(35-4-1 et seq.) are purely statutory, p r o .
cedure i> statutory, and deputy, 'appeal
tribunal and commission have only such
authority as is cxpiessly granted. National
Tunnel & Mines Co. v. Industrial Comm
99 U. 39. 102 P. 2d 50?, distinguished in
117 U. 471, 217 P. 2d 5C(.
Collateral References.
Social Security and Public WelfareC=»
251.
b) C..7.S. Social Sccuritv and Public
Welfare §§ 75-252.
One who uses his own truck as an independent contractor or an employee of
concern for which he transports goods,
wilhin Social Security or Unemployment
Compensation Act, 144 A. L. R. 740, 151
A. L. R. 1331.

35-4-2. Public policy—General welfare requires creation of unemployment reserves—Employment offices.—As a guide to the interpretation and
application of this act, the public policy of this state is declared to be as
follows: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to
the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this stale. Unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and concern which requires
appropriate action by the legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten
its burden which now so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family. The achievement of social security requires
protection against this greatest hazard of our economic life. This objective can be furthered by operating free public employment offices in affiliation with a nation-wide system of employment services, by devising appropriate methods for reducing the volume of unemployment and by the
systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment from
which benefits may be paid for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of unemployment. The legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered
judgment the public good, and the general welfare of the citizens of this
state require the enactment of this measure, under the police power of
the state, for the establishment and maintenance of free public employment offices and for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of unemployed persons.
History:
42-2a*2.

L. 1941, cli. 40, § 2 ; C. 1943,

Constitutional basis.
The Unemployment Compensation L a w
(3."-4-J et SQ{\.) was enaered under and as
an exercise of the police power of the

state. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Industrial Comm., 104 U. 17o, 134 P. 2d 479,
reh. den. 104 U. 196, 141 P. 2d 694.
Liberal construction.
The Employment Security Act (3o-4-l
et seq.), being remedial under the police

35-4-10
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Court" and deleted the former sixth sentence
which read: "The actions and the questions certified shall be heard in a summary manner and
shall be given precedence over all other civil
cases except cases arising under the Workmen's Compensation Law under this state.";

and made various stylistic changes throughout
the section.
Meaning of "this act". — The phrase "tnig
act" in the first sentence of Subsection la) fi rs!
appeared in this section as enacted by Lawk
1941. ch. 40, * 10. That act (Laws 1941,"ch. 4Q)
enacted this chapter.

ANALYSIS

Appeals to board of review.
Disputed evidence.
Due process of law.
Evidence at hearing.
Judicial review.
Standard of review.
Timely filing.
Cued.*
Appeals to board of review.
On appeal from a decision of an appeals referee, the board of review is not bound by the
findings of fact made by the referee even if supported by the evidence, but may make findings
of its own based on the same or additional evidence. Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Review
of Industrial Comm. (Utah 1977) 568 P 2d 727.
The board of review is not limited to consideration of that evidence previously submitted
in the administrative process but may consider
additional evidence as well. Box Elder County
v. Industrial Comm. (Utah 1981 • 632 P 2d 839.
Disputed evidence.
The mere fact that some evidence is introduced which disputes other evidence does not
compel the conclusion that the board's decision
is unsupported by any evidence. Young v.
Board of Review, No. 860350 (Utah Sup. Ct.
filed Dec. 16, 1986).
Due process of law.
Employer was not denied due process of law
by fact that employees of the industrial commission presided over the administrative hearings on employer's liability for failing to file
timely contribution reports. Vali Convalescent
& Care Institution v. Industrial Comm. of
Utah (Utah 1982) 649 P 2d 33.
Evidence at hearing.
This section and the regulations prescribed
by the commission authorize departure from
strict adherence to the hearsay rule at unemployment compensation hearings; however, to
be admissible, there must be some reasonable
basis for inferring the reliability of hearsay evidence, as gossip or rumor will not suffice as
admissible evidence. Trotta v. Department of
Employment Security (Utah 19S3) 664 P 2d
1195.
Judicial review.
The court is to sustain the determination of

the board of review unless the record clearlv
and persuasively proves the action of the board
was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Review of In.
dustrial Comm. (Utah 1977) 568 P 2d 727.
The supreme court must sustain the factual
findings of the board of review if supported by
substantial evidence: however, supreme court
does not defer to the board's application of the
legal standards unless the statutory language
construed evinces a legislative intention to
commit broad discretion to the administrative
agency, or the agency, because of its expertise
in a given area, is in a better position than the
reviewing court to give content and meaning to
the statutory terms. Trotta v. Department of
Employment Security (Utah 1983) 664 P 2d
1195.
The commission's findings of fact are conclusive and binding, and are to be sustained if
supported by competent and substantial evidence in the record. Northwest Foods Ltd. v.
Board of Review, No. 20860 (Utah Sup. Ct.
filed Dec. 5, 19861
Standard of review.
Finding by board of review that unemployment compensation claimant had knowingly
failed to report a material fact regarding hours
worked and or money earned, rendering him
ineligible for further compensation, pursuant
to the provisions of 35-4-5, would not be disturbed by the supreme court on review where
supported by competent evidence. Whitcome v.
Department of Employment Security, Industrial Comm. (Utah 1977) 564 P 2d 1116; Baker
v. Department of Employment Security. Industrial Comm. (Utah 197*7) 564 P 2d 1126.
In judicial review by supreme court of determination made by the board of review, the evidence is to be looked at in the light most favorable to the findings: and in so doing, if there is
evidence of any substance whatever which can
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rea&onabh i>e regarded ah s.upporun£ the de. termination madt. the determination must be
affirmed Taylor v Department of Employment
Security. Industrial Comm. <Ulah 1982> f>47 P
,
,
, . ,
In reviewing board of review & determination
that conduct of employee was not so culpable
as to disauahfv him" from benefits on the
ground that ne was discharged for an act that
was deliberate, willful or wanton and adverse
to his employer's rightful interests, supreme
court employed an "intermediate" standard of
review. under which the boards decision must
fall within the limits of reasonableness or rationality under such standard, the board's decision wil be affirmed unless, as a matter of
law. the decision was wronc because onlv the
opposite conclusion could be drawn from the
facts. Citv of Orem v. Chnstensen (Utah 1984)
ggo p OJ ouo
~ """"
Timely
filing.
The timeh filing of petitions of review, like

35-4-11

thai o; notices of appeal from judicial orders, is
jurisdictional. Leonczyn>ki \ Board of Review,
713 p 2d 706 <Utah 1985'
The Department of Employment Secunn did
not abuse its discretion in refu^inp to consider
,
, .
*
an
_ ^ P 1 ^ P ^ e s t to the benefits awarded
where lne
rolesl w a s n m flied Wlth,n
P
^n
davs
Mini Spas, Inc v. Industrial Commn, No.
860212 (Utah Sup Ct. filed Feb. 3, 1987)
An administrative law judge's refusal to consider an employer's untimely protest of a determination of benefits bv the department of emsecurity did not contravene a
p l 0 vment
f
da;med
bhc
w reheve a
o f de _
, f
- ^ ^
neglect."
f
o r -excusable
.,
.
, ,
, ,,
. * K,
M,ni
*»**' } n L - v 1 " " ^ ™ ! Commn. No.
8 6 0 2 1 2 ( U t a h Su
Ct
flled Feb
3
1PS7)
P- - Cited in Logan Regional Hosp. v. Board of
Review. 723 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986).

35-4-11. Administration of Employment Security Act.
(aHl» It is the duty of the Industrial Commission to administer this chapter. The commission is entitled to adopt, amend, or rescind any rules and
special orders, to employ persons, make expenditures, require reports,
make investigations, make audits of any or all funds provided for under
this chapter when necessary, and take any other action it considers necessary or suitable to that end. The commission shall create the Department
of Employment Security for the purpose of administering this chapter. All
personnel of that department, including a full-time administrator, shall
be employed on a nonpartisan merit basis. The full-time administrator
shall, with the approval of the commission, determine the department's
organization and methods of procedure in accordance with the provisions
of this chapter, and he shall, under direction of the commission, supervise
the department personnel and its operations. The Department of Employment Security shall have an official seal which shall be judicially noticed.
Not later than the first day of October of each year, the commission shall
submit to the governor a report covering the administration and operation of this chapter during the preceding calendar year and shall make
any recommendations for amendments to this chapter as the commission
considers proper. The report shall include a balance sheet of the moneys
in the fund in which there shall be provided, if possible, a reserve against
liability in future years to pay benefits in excess of the then current
contributions, which reserve shall be set up by the commission in accordance with accepted actuarial principles on the basis of statistics of employment, business activity, and other relevant factors for the longest
possible period. Whenever the commission believes that a change in contribution or benefit rates will become necessary to protect the solvency of
the fund, it shall promptly inform the governor and the Legislature and
make appropriate recommendations.
(2) Any two commissioners constitute a quorum. No vacancy impairs
the right of the remaining commissioners to exercise all the powers of the
commission.
185
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Ruies.
(b> The commission may adopt, amend, or rescind rules in accordance w i ^
Chapter 46a, Title 63. The commission may adopt, amend, or rescind special
orders after appropriate notice and opportunity to be heard Special orders
become effective ten days after notification or mailing to the last known address of the individuals or concerns affected thereby.
Printing and Distribution of Act and Rules of Commission.
ic) The commission shall cause to be printed for distribution to the public
the text of this chapter, the commission's rules, its annual reports to the
governor, and any other material the commission considers relevant and suitable and shall furnish the same to any person upon application.
Personnel Merit System.
id) The commission shall appoint on a nonpartisan merit basis, fix the
compensation, and prescribe the duties and powers of officers, accountants,
attorneys, experts, and other personnel as necessary in the performance of its
duties. The commission shall provide for a merit system covering all those
persons, classify and fix the minimum standards for the personnel and formulate salary schedules for the service so classified. The commission shall hold or
provide for holding examinations to determine the technical and professional
qualifications of applicants for positions in the commission, and provide for
annual merit ratings of employees in the commission to ascertain whether the
employees are maintaining the eligibility standards prescribed by the commission and those promulgated by the social security board. No employee may
be separated or demoted so long as he meets the eligibility standards of performance; however, when a reduction in personnel is made because of lack of
funds, curtailment of work, or the elimination of specific positions or classes of
positions or identifiable programs, an employee thus separated, reclassified,
or reassigned shall be separated, reclassified, or reassigned without prejudice
and in accordance with an established separation formula based on merit
system principles and tenure of service approved by the commission and the
United States Department of Labor. The commission may delegate to any
person so appointed the power and authority it considers reasonable and
proper for the effective administration of this chapter and may, in its discretion, bond any person handling moneys or signing checks hereunder. The
commission is authorized in its discretion to provide for the maintenance of
the merit system required under this section in cooperation and conjunction
with any merit system applicable to any state agency or agencies which meets
the standards of the commission and those promulgated by the social security
board. The commission is authorized when permissible under federal and
state law to make arrangements that will permit individuals employed under
this chapter to voluntarily elect coverage under the United States CiviJ Service Retirement System with respect to past as well as future services.
Advisory Council.
• e- The commission shall appoint a state advisory council composed of not
less than four employer representatives chosen from individuals recommended by employers, an equal number of employee representatives chosen
from individuals recommended by employee groups, and three public representatives who may fairly be regarded as representative because of their
vocation, employment, or affiliations. The council members shall be appointed
for two-year terms which commence July 1 and end J u n e 30. The first term
under this provision shall commence July 1, 1949. however, the commission
1S6
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shall terminate the term of am council memoer when he has ceased to be
representative as designated by his original appointment. The commission
may appoint local advisory councils composed of an equal number of emplover
representatives and employee representatives who may fairly be regarded as
representative because of their vocation, employment, or affiliations and of
the members representing the general public as the commission may designate. The state and local advisory councils shall aid the commission in formulating policies and discussing problems related to the administration of this
chapter and in assuring impartiality and freedom from political influence in
the solution of those problems. The members of the advisory councils shall
each be paid for each day of attendance at meetings necessary to the performance of their duties, plus necessary expenses, as provided by law.
Employment Stabilization.
(f) The commission with the advice and aid of its advisory councils shall
take all appropriate steps to reduce and prevent unemployment; to encourage
and assist in the adoption of practical methods of vocational training, retraining and vocational guidance; to investigate, recommend, advise, and assist in
the establishment and operation, by the state, of reserves for public works to
be used in times of business depression and unemployment; to promote the
creation and development of job opportunities and the reemployment of unemployed workers throughout the state in every way that may be feasible; to
plan, coordinate, organize, or direct economic development programs as are
necessary to maintain or create job opportunities; to cooperate with local
communities, industries and organizations in encouraging and promoting the
full development of the state's mineral, water, and other natural resources; to
appraise the agricultural and industrial potential of the state; to these ends to
carry on activities and organize, coordinate, and publish the results of investigations and research studies. To accomplish these purposes the commission
may enter into agreements with governmental or other agencies.
Employment Unit Records — Confidential.
ig) Each employing unit shall keep true and accurate work records containing any information the commission may prescribe b> rule. The records shall
be open to inspection and subject to being copied by the commission or its
authorized representatives at any reasonable time and as often as may be
necessary. The commission may require from any employing unit any sworn
or unsworn reports with respect to persons employed by it which the commission deems necessary for the effective administration of this chapter. Information thus obtained or obtained from any individuals shall not be published or
be open to public inspection, other than to public employees in the performance of their public duties, in any manner revealing the employing unit's or
individual's identity, but any party to a hearing before an appeals referee or
the commission shall be supplied with information from these records to the
extent necessary for the proper presentation of his case, provided, that the
commission shall upon request in writing from any employer furnish in writing any information requested concerning claims for benefits with respect to
his former employees.
Oaths — Depositions — Witnesses.
(h) In the discharge of the duties imposed by this chapter, the appeals
referee or duly authorized representative or member of the commission or the
board of review as designated by commission rule, has power to administer
oaths and affirmations, take depositions, certify to official acts, and issue
1ST

35-4-H

LABO!.—INPl'-^TRIAl COMMISSI* >\

subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of "hooks,
papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records necessary as e v i n c e
in "connection with a disputed matter or the administration of this chapter.
Court to Issue Subpoenas — Compel Attendance.
(i> In case of contumacy by. or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any
person anv court of this state within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry j s
carried on or, within the jurisdiction of which the person guilty of contumacy
or refusal to obev is found or resides or transacts business, upon application by
an appeals referee or the board of review or the commission or its duly authorized representative, shall have jurisdiction to issue to that person an order
requiring the person to appear before a commissioner, an appeals referee, or
the board of review, or the commission, or its duly authorized representative,
to produce evidence if so ordered or give testimony regarding the matter
under investigation or in question; and any failure to obey that order of the
court may be punished by the court a> contempt. Any person who. without just
cause, fails or refuses to attend and testify or to answer any lawful inquiry or
to produce books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records, if it
is in his power to do so, in obedience to a subpoena of an appeals referee, or the
board of review, or the commission, shall be punished by a fine of not less than
S20 nor more than $200 o> by imprisonment for not longer than £0 days or by
both fine and imprisonment. Each day the violation continues is a separate
offense.
Self-incrimination.
(j) No person may be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records before the
commission or its representatives or in obedience to the subpoena of the commission or any of its members or any duly authorized representative of the
commission in any cause or proceeding before the commission or its representatives on the ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty
or forfeiture. No individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning
which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, except that
the individual testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed while testifying.
Cooperation with Federal Agencies.
Ik) (D In the administration of this chapter, the commission shall cooperate
with the United States Department of Labor to the fullest extent consistent with the provisions of this chapter and shall take action, through the
adoption of appropriate rules and administrative methods and standards,
as necessary to secure to this state and its citizens all advantages available under the provisions of the Social Security Ac; that relate to unemployment compensation, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, the
Wagner-Peyser Act. and the Federal-State Extended Unemployment
Compensation Act of 1970.
(2^ In the administration of the provisions in fc 35-4-3.5, which are
enacted to conform with the requirements of the Federal-State Extended
Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970. the commission shall take
that action necessary to ensure that the provisions are so interpreted and
applied as to meet the requirements of the federal act as interpreted by
1SS

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

35-4-11

the United States Departmeni of Labor and to secure to this state the full
reimbursement of the federal share of extended and regular benefits paid
under this chapter that are reimbursable under the federal act.
Determination of Employer and Employment.
ll) The commission or its authorized representatives may upon its own motion or upon application of an employing unit determine whether an employing unit constitutes an employer and whether services performed for, or in
connection with the business of, an employer constitute employment for the
employing unit. The determinations may constitute the basis for determination of contribution liability under the provisions of Subsection 35-4-17ib* and
be subject to review and appeal as provided.
History: L. 1941, ch. 40. <f 11; C. 1943,
42-2a-ll; L. 1949, ch. 53, £ 1; 1951, ch. 50,
fc 1; 1955, ch. 60. £ 1; 1957, ch. «4. * 3; 1971,
ch. 78, 5 6; 1982, ch. 78, £ 7; 1983, ch. 320,
$ 15; 1987, ch. 81, $ 7.
Compiler's Notes. — The 1981! amendment
inserted captions before subsecs. ihi through
i\\ substituted "lieutenant governor" in the
third sentence o r subsec. (b> for "secretary of
state"; substituted "an amount to be determined by the board of examiners" in the last
sentence of subsec <e> for "a fee of not more
than SI5 per day"; and made minor changes in
phraseology, punctuation and style.
The 1983 amendment deleted "an amount to
be determined by the board of examiners" after
"shall be paid" in the last sentence of subsec.
(e». added "as provided by law" to the last sentence of subsec. (e); and made minor changes in
phraseology and punctuation.
The 19S7 amendment, effective July 1, 1987.
rewrote Subsection (b»; deleted the former fifth
sentence of Subsection td), which provided
"The commission shall not employ or pay any
person who is an officer or committee member
of the any political party organization"; inserted "United States" preceding "Department
of Labor" twice in Subsection (k); and made
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation.
The Federal-State Extended Unemployment
Compensation Act of 1970. referred in Subsection (k), appears as 26 U.S.C § 3304.
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act. referred to Subsection ik>, appears as 26 U.S.C.
5 3301 et sec.
The federal Wagner-Peyser Act. referred in
Subsection (k), appears as 29 U.S.C. fc 49 et
sec;.
Department
of E m p l o y m e n t
Security
Building.
Laws 197S. ch. 255. provides: "Section 1.
There is hereby appropriated out of funds made
available to this state under Section 903 of the
Social Security Act, as amended, the sum of

$208,343 or so much thereof as may be necessary, to be expended by and under the direction
of the department of employment hecunty with
the approval of the state building board for the
purpose of acquiring land and erecting buildings thereon for the use of the department of
employment security, and for such improvements, facilities, paving, landscaping, and
fixed equipment as may be required for their
proper use and operation b\ the department of
employment security.
"Section 2. No part of the monies hereby appropriated may be obligated after the expiration of the two-year period beginning on the
effective date of this act.
"Section o. The amount obligated pursuant
to this act during any 12-month period beginning on July 1 and ending on the next J u n e 30
shall not exceed the amount by which ia» the
aggregate of the amounts credited to the account of this state pursuant to Section 903 of
the Social Security Act during such 12-month
period and the 24 preceding 12-month periods
exceeds (b> the aggregate of the amounts obligated for administration and paid out for benefits iind charged against the amounts credited
to the account of this state during such 25 12month periods.
"Section 4. This act shall take effect upon
approval." Approved March 13, 1979.
Right of c o m m i s s i o n to a p p o i n t attorneys.
The attorney general does not have exclusive
constitutional authority to act as legal adviser
to the industrial commission in the administration of the Unemployment Compensation
Act: therefore, the provision of this section authorizing the commission to appoint attorneys
does no: violate Art. VII. fc 16 of the state constitution: furthermore, this section provides an
exception to the general authority of the attorney general to perform legal services for any
agency of state government. Hansen v. Utah
State Retirement Bd. (Utah 1982; 652 P 2d
1332.
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I hereby certify that, on the

^

day of March,

1988, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the
following:
HELGESEN & WATERFALL
Jack C. Helgesen
4768 Harrison Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84403
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